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How Polish society has been helping refugees from Ukraine

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Key numbers

PLN 25.4 billion (EUR 5.45 billion, 0.97% of Poland's GDP)

– estimated total value of annual spending by the Polish government and of Poles' private spending during the first 3 months of the war in connection with helping refugees

1.207 million

refugees are currently staying in Poland, according to administrative data from the PESEL system (as of 2.07.2022),

94.1% of the refugees are women and children

PLN 15.9 billion

(EUR 3.41 billion, 0.61% of Poland's GDP)

– estimated value of total annual spending by the public authorities on helping refugees

PLN 5.5 billion (EUR 1.18 billion)

– estimated minimum value of Poles' private spending in connection with helping refugees from Ukraine during the first 3 months of the war

PLN 9–10 billion (EUR 1.93–2.14 billion, 0.34–0.38% of Poland's GDP)

– estimated value of Poles' private spending in connection with helping refugees from Ukraine during the period analysed

PLN 3.9 billion (EUR 0.83 billion)

– estimated minimum value of Poles' private spending on charitable causes in 2021 as a whole

36%

of the people who made financial and material donations during the first 3 months of the war spent PLN 100–499 (EUR 21–107) on refugees (the most frequently declared range)

8%

of Poles spent over PLN 1000 (EUR 214) on refugees during the period analysed

77%

of adult Poles have gotten involved in helping refugees from Ukraine since the Russian invasion

7%

of Poles hosted refugees at their apartments or houses

35%

of Poles got involved in formal and organisational assistance for refugees and various forms of volunteering

Key findings

- **Most of Polish society (77%) has gotten involved in helping refugees from Ukraine.** This help has taken a variety of forms: from financial and material support, to various types of voluntary work, and to inviting people deprived of homes into one's own house or flat.
- **The scale of Poles' engagement was largest at the start of the war,** when 70% of adults were involved in helping refugees. This was largely driven by a desire to help and constituted a spontaneous reaction (often an emotional one) to refugees' suffering and the growing number arriving in Poland to escape the war. At the same time, **half of Poles were engaged in helping refugees consistently – both at the start of the war and in subsequent weeks.**
- The amount Poles spent on **helping refugees** over the first three months of the war was **higher** than the amount they donated to **charity in 2021 as a whole.**
- **Poles have spent at least PLN 5.5 billion (EUR 1.18 billion) on helping refugees. According to estimates, the most likely actual value of Polish citizens' financial assistance for refugees from Ukraine is PLN 9-10 billion (EUR 1.93-2.14 billion).** This estimate takes into account the value of funds transferred to refugees in the form of direct transfers or through public fundraising. It also includes the value of goods and items purchased for the benefit of refugees, the accommodation and food they were offered, and other forms of support. The estimate is based on respondents' declarations concerning the value of the resources they devoted to helping refugees in various ways.
- **Personal income is clearly linked to the level of engagement:** the higher someone's revenue, the more involved they were in helping refugees. Among the people with the highest monthly income (above PLN 5000 net, EUR 1070), the percentage of people who helped refugees the most in relative terms was three times higher than among the people with the lowest income (below PLN 2000 – EUR 428). Yet **even among people earning less than PLN 2000 net (EUR 428), support was widespread – just 26% of people in this group did not help in any way. This may reflect how Polish society stepped in to help Ukrainians en masse.**

- **Other factors were correlated with a strong commitment to helping, too, including: involvement in charity activities before the war, direct contact with foreigners (especially Ukrainians) before the war, and regularly following media coverage of the war and refugees' fate.**
- **Women got involved in helping refugees more often than men.** 28% of surveyed men said they were not involved at all, compared to just 19% of women.
- **The scale, form and intensity of assistance evolved with the development of the refugee crisis and expectations relating to the end of the war.** At the start, **spontaneous help** dominated: grassroots initiatives by the Polish public, a massive and rapid social effort of an unprecedented nature, supported by local government bodies and the central authorities. **During the next stage, adaptation, the role of the state increased** and the role of civil society decreased. During this phase, assistance began to take place within the framework of the welfare state; refugees obtained access to services and benefits on the same terms as Polish citizens. The last stage, **integration**, requires coordination between many different entities to ensure social cohesion, manage new resources, and eliminate social tensions between the people who have arrived and Polish society.

Introduction

The huge spontaneous solidarity between Poles and refugees – referred to as “humanitarian super-power” in the international media – needs to be described, but also explained (www1). In addition to society, the local and central authorities were involved in helping refugees, too. Yet while it is relatively easy to calculate the scale of state and institutional aid subject

to official reporting, the scale of aid by individuals is much more difficult to estimate. Its scattered and mostly unregistered nature prevents simple estimates. At the same time, this assistance was not only material, but largely symbolic, because in many cases it preceded institutional assistance and significantly influenced the shaping of public opinion in other countries. In this way, it indirectly helped create pressure that countries’ governments had to respond to.

To examine the scale of Polish society's involvement and estimate its value, we conducted a survey on a nationwide representative sample of adult residents of Poland. In our opinion, the survey method, in which the respondents provided information on the scale of their own assistance, is the only one that achieves this study’s aims. This method can be criticised for being imprecise, because it is based on respondents’ declarations, formulated after the events, and assumes that they are factually correct. Aware of the methodological limitations of this method, we have made every effort to ensure that the data collected was reliable and properly interpreted.

The survey, which forms the basis for the estimates in this report, was carried out using the telephone interview method (CATI) between April 25 and May 19, 2022. To obtain the most reliable data, we provided a larger research sample than in standard polls. We surveyed 2,200 adult residents of Poland (aged 20 and over). The questions concerned the ways in which the respondents helped refugees, the scale of this assistance and, wherever possible, its value, as estimated by respondents. For a detailed description of the sample, see the methodological appendix.

Our research is not the first attempt to assess the scale of aid provided to refugees by Poles; similar attempts were made during earlier phases of the war. Respondents were asked about how they are helping refugees, the scale of

This report seeks to estimate the scale of Polish society's involvement in helping refugees from Ukraine and the approximate value of the aid provided during the first three months of the war.¹

¹ The surveys commissioned for the purposes of this report were carried out under tender no. PZP.1.2022 – part 2 and part 3.

help, and the most appropriate ways of providing it (Szlachetna Paczka, 2022; *Gazeta Prawna*, 2022).

Our study's primary aim was to define the scale and forms of aid and to estimate the approximate value of the financial support for refugees provided by Polish society. These estimates enable us to view Polish society as an important and irreplaceable actor in the aid effort. This kind of perspective, where spontaneous social engagement is crucial, sets this refugee crisis apart from many previous ones. In our report, we provide an in-depth analysis of individual forms of assistance provided to refugees that is as comprehensive as possible, and look at the social, demographic and psychological factors that may have affected Poles' level of involvement. As this survey was conducted later than the other studies (data collection began two months after the Russian invasion), we were able to track the change in the intensity of involvement over time more effectively.


Chapter 1.

The Russian invasion and unprecedented wave of refugees

At the start of the war, Poland was already the main destination for civilians fleeing Ukraine. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' data, 8.4 million people have fled Ukraine since the start of the war; so far, up to 3.1 million of them have returned (as of 2.07.2022). According to UN data, the largest share of refugees, 51%, went to Poland (UNHCR, 2022). This large influx was helped by the long border between Poland and Ukraine, official declarations by the Polish authorities indicating their readiness to take in everyone seeking refuge from the war, and the large and well-organised Ukrainian minority living in Poland before the war. The Centre of Migration Research's data indicates that there may already have been 1.35 million Ukrainians living in Poland before the war (Duszczuk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022).

The number of refugees from Ukraine who are actually in Poland is much lower than the number of those who have arrived from Ukraine during the war. Some of the refugees who arrived during the first days of the war only stayed in Poland for a short time, before moving on to another European Union country. Estimates by the Centre of Migration Research (2022) indicate that, of the 2.2 million refugees who had crossed the border with Poland by the end of April, around 800,000 (36%) went on to other countries, especially other ones in the EU. In addition, the wave of refugees weakened clearly after 10 March: the number of border crossings into Poland dropped from 117,600 to 87,000 in a day. At the same time, the number of people leaving Poland for Ukraine increased.

Chart 1. Migration on the Polish-Ukrainian border in 24.02-02.07.2022



Source: prepared by PEI based on Border Guard data, cited in: (Kubisiak, 2022).


Administrative data from the PESEL system shows that the number of refugees living in Poland as of 2 July 2022 may amount to 1.207 million people (Open Data, 2022). Some researchers have indicated that this number may be higher, ranging from 1.45 million to 1.55 million (www2, www3, Duszczuk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). A PESEL number gives refugees the right to social benefits, including a one-time payment of PLN 300 per person, benefits from the 500+ programme, and Family Care Capital. It can therefore be concluded that most of the refugees who live in Poland have registered for a PESEL number.² **It can also be assumed that the number of refugees in Poland at the start of the war, and therefore of recipients of assistance, was higher than the number in Poland now.**

Most of the refugees in Poland are women and children – 94.1% of them.

Children up to the age of 18 make up 45.6% of the refugee population, while women between the ages of 18 and 65 account for 45.1%. The refugees' demographic structure, in which a dominant role is played by people of non-working age or women with caring responsibilities, was important when determining refugees' future economic potential of refugees (the possibility of them joining the labour market), but also when estimating the likely scale of the state's involvement in helping refugees.

² This is confirmed by Ministry of Family and Social Policy data, according to which, by June 23, 2022, 963,000 people had been granted the one-off payment of PLN 300.


**Chart 2. Demographic structure of refugees registered in the PESEL system
(% and thousands, as of 2.07.2022)**



Source: prepared by PEI based on data from the *Otwarte Dane* (2022) website.

Most of the refugees who have stayed in Poland live in the largest urban centres. This pattern of settlement and relocation decisions was primarily influenced by the greater chances of finding a job in major cities, as well as existing family networks and social ties between newly-arrived refugees and Ukrainians already living there. According to data on where people registered in the PESEL system, there are 118,000 refugees in Warsaw, 41,900 in Wrocław, and 31,000 in Kraków.

Map 1. Number of applications registered in the PESEL system by district, as of 2.07.2022



Source: prepared by PEI based on data from the *Otwarte Dane* (2022) website.

Chapter 2.


Poles' engagement in helping refugees

Polish society, local governments and the central authorities have all joined forces to help refugees in Poland since the start of the war. During the first days after the invasion, spontaneous, grassroots involvement could be observed all over Poland. It included direct material and financial support for refugees near the border, as well as various forms of support for Ukrainians across Poland. The second major pillar of assistance were local governments, especially in municipalities near border crossings. Using their own funds, as well as institutional and human resources, they organised help at border crossings and reception points. At the beginning of the war, government assistance focused on legislative changes aimed at increasing border crossings' capacity, defining refugees' legal status in Poland, and making their first months in Poland easier.

The scale and forms of social engagement in helping refugees

The mobilisation of Polish society to help Ukrainian refugees was unprecedented, adapted to the scale of the challenge Poland faced as the host (or transit country) for the largest group of refugees. The level of assistance was highest at the start of the war, when – according to respondents' declarations – 70% of them were involved in some form of assistance. With time, after refugees' situation in Poland stabilised, the scale of active involvement decreased. Around the start of May, 57% respondents said they were involved in some form of aid. As many as 50% of respondents said they were involved both at the beginning of the war and when the study was conducted.


Chart 3. Scale of Poles' engagement in helping refugees at the start and at a later stage of the war (%)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

The scale of society's involvement was also unprecedented, compared to involvement in charitable and social causes before the war. Before the war, 17% of respondents dedicated their private time to activities that help others; in the case of 35% of them, it was sporadic (a few times a year or less).


Infographic 1. Poles' social engagement before Russia invaded Ukraine



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Significantly more respondents, 70%, supported a variety of causes with financial or material donations, but 49% of them did so a few times a year, at the most. 21% did so at least once a month or more frequently.







Chart 4. Frequency of support for charitable causes before Russia invaded Ukraine (% of respondents)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Material and financial donations were the two leading forms of support for refugees after the war began. 59% of respondents bought essential items and 53% donated money to refugees (Infographic 2). Less popular forms were helping refugees sort out various matters (20% of respondents) and volunteering, broadly understood, not only as part of formal organisations, but also as part of grassroots initiatives, providing unpaid work to help refugees (17% of respondents). 7% of respondents said they made their own home available to refugees. The question concerned both taking refugees into one's own home and letting them stay at one's uninhabited apartment, regardless of how long the refugees were hosted. 6% of respondents said they helped refugees through employment or help finding employment, and 5% by providing or organising transport from the border for refugees.

Infographic 2. Poles' participation in various forms of assistance during the first three months of the war (%)

	Buying items	59%
	Donating money	53%
	Helping refugees sort out various matters	20%
	Volunteering one's own time	17%
	Providing housing	7%
	Transport (including from the border)	5%

Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

The value of financial assistance

From the very beginning, the assistance provided to refugees was based on spontaneous actions and grassroots social initiatives. Right at the start of the war, Poles began donating their money and time to help people fleeing the war. The grassroots, broad social involvement at the start of the war gave the authorities the time needed to implement formal procedures, including legislative changes, and activate official aid. Despite considerable social mobilisation – both in terms of the number of people and the resources involved – only a small share of this aid was made public (see box below).

Institutional and public assistance

According to information provided by the largest institutions helping refugees, the estimated value of the support provided through them was at least **PLN 326.7 million (EUR 69.9 million)**. Caritas Polska said it collected PLN 100 million (EUR 21.4 million) in funds and PLN 132 million (EUR 28.3 million) worth of material donations (www4), the Siepomaga.pl foundation PLN 52 million (EUR 11.1 million) (www5) Polish Humanitarian Action PLN 32 million (EUR 6.8 million) (www6) and the Solidarni z Ukrainą foundation PLN 11.7 million (EUR 2.5 million)(www7). It is worth noting that, although they are the largest in the country, these organisations constitute just a share of all the NGOs helping refugees in Poland.

The law on assistance for Ukrainian citizens (www8) processed at the beginning of the war set out the planned involvement of public funds to reimburse Poles for the expenses incurred when providing refugees with accommodation and food. This type of support – PLN 40 (EUR 8.6) per day per person who received accommodation and meals – was provided for a period of 120 days. According to the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, by June 8, 2022, PLN 2 billion (EUR 0.4 billion) had been transferred to local governments for this purpose (www9). These are the funds that will ultimately reach Polish households involved in helping refugees.

Other types of public aid offered to refugees are access to benefits and social assistance on the same terms as Polish citizens, as well as access to public services (especially healthcare and education), psychological assistance, a one-off benefit of PLN 300 (EUR 64) per person, and others – described in detail in the act. According to the estimates in the act's Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), the RIA to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers to the act,³ and the Ministry of Health's estimates on the costs of healthcare for refugees, this type of assistance may cost as much as PLN 15.9 billion (EUR 3.41 billion) per year, an equivalent of 0.61% of Poland's GDP in 2021. A detailed breakdown of the costs is presented in Table 1.

Estimating how much Poles spent on helping refugees is a difficult task and requires certain assumptions. Bearing in mind that, during the interview, respondents may not have been able to provide the exact values they are asked about (a fact documented in academic research) (Sułek, 2001), we decided to use a closed question and only ask respondents to indicate the range their financial assistance. Respondents chose one of the following ranges: PLN 0, less than PLN 100, 100-499, 500-999, over PLN 1,000 (EUR 0, less than EUR 21.4, EUR 21.4-106, EUR 107-214, over EUR 214 respectively).⁴

We can assume that asking a closed question with defined intervals, like in our study, does not lead to excessive loss of information. Inevitably, the information provided by respondents when answering open-ended questions is almost always indicative and subject to a certain degree of inaccuracy.

³ Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the maximum cash payment for providing Ukrainian citizens with accommodation and meals and the conditions for granting and extending it, 03/11/2022.

⁴ All original values in PLN have been converted to EUR using the National Bank of Poland's average exchange rate for the period analysed (25.04.2022-19.05.2022).

Table 1. Estimated annual public spending related to providing refugees from Ukraine with support⁵

Form of support	Foreseen spending (millions of PLN and EUR)	Assumed number of refugees in Poland
Education	PLN 4,039.2 – EUR 864.6	200,000
Reimbursing Poles who provided refugees with accommodation and food	PLN 2,400.0 – EUR 513.7	
Healthcare	PLN 2,400.0 – EUR 513.7	1 million
Child benefits	PLN 2,280.0 – EUR 488.0	190,000
On-off payment of PLN 300 PLN per person*	PLN 289.0 – EUR 61.9	962,000
Social assistance	PLN 726.0 – EUR 155.4	
Psychological assistance	PLN 24.8 – EUR 5.3	
Assistance for people who found themselves alone	PLN 9.2 – EUR 2.0	
Other	PLN 3,741 – EUR 800.8	
Total	PLN 15,911.8 – EUR 3,405.4	

* data on the number of beneficiaries of the one-off benefit of PLN 300 per person and related expenses were obtained from the Ministry of Family and Social Policy. Data as of 23/06/2022.

Source: prepared by PEI based on RIA to the law on assistance for Ukrainian citizens (2022), RIA to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers (2022); Ministry of Health estimates (www10) "Głos Nauczycielski" weekly ("Teachers' Voice") estimates (www11).

This is due in part to the unreliability of human memory, notably the fact that, as a rule, we do not tend to collect accurate information.⁶ We therefore expect that respondents did not make a note of or in any way record the exact amount they spent on helping refugees. Asking a closed question does not make the information obtained less accurate, and has the advantage that it is simpler and does not require significant cognitive engagement by respondents.


In the interview scenario, we sought to make it easier for respondents to take into account every form of financial involvement. Partly for this reason, they were only asked about the scale of financial involvement after they had been asked a series of questions about their involvement in specific forms of assistance. The amount therefore includes all the funds spent on this purpose – both cash donations and funds spent on goods, housing, food or other support.

⁵ The estimated total amount spent results from the adoption of upper values for the number of refugees residing in Poland. In the RIA, two base scenarios concerning the number of refugees were adopted for the act: a minimum value of 486,000 people and a maximum value of 972,000, with the estimated number of children ranging from 95,000 to 190,000.

⁶ The relatively short period between the time when the money was spent and the time when the survey was conducted was an advantage for this survey.

The largest group of respondents (36%) spent PLN 100-499 on helping refugees. Almost half of respondents (44%) did not spend any money or only small amounts (up to PLN 100), while a smaller group (20%) incurred significant expenses, exceeding PLN 500. Some Poles contributed even more financially: one in five people spent over PLN 500, and 8% over PLN 1,000 (Chart 5).⁷

Chart 5. Amount spent by private individuals on helping refugees during the first three months of the war (% of respondents)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.


In total, Poles' personal financial contribution to helping refugees exceeded PLN 5.5 billion (EUR 1.18 billion). The scale of financial assistance cannot be estimated accurately: in addition to the above-mentioned reasons linked to the inability to obtain precise information from respondents, we were unable to obtain representative data for people who spent the most on assistance, because they make up a small share of the population. However, it is relatively certain that at least PLN 5.5 billion was spent, calculated on the basis of the lower limits in the ranges. For calculation details, see the methodological appendix.

The actual amount Poles spent on helping refugees is probably in the PLN 9-10 billion (EUR 1.93-2.14 billion) range, that is 0.34-0.38% of Poland's GDP in 2021. We estimated the values in this range using three different methodological approaches. In approach (1), we used the means of the ranges indicated by respondents. In approach (2), based on the assumptions we developed, we shifted the multiplier in the form of interval measures appropriately. In approach (3), we focused on solving the estimation problem on the basis of representative data of the top values that appear relatively rarely in the population, but are relatively important for the final result. Each of the three approaches (described in detail in the methodological appendix) led to similar results.

⁷ In Figure 5, we do not take into account the unequal length of the intervals. One might get the impression that Poles' financial involvement was similar to the normal distribution. This chart only shows the frequency of responses for specific categories. Chart A1 in the methodological appendix provides a more reliable representation of the variable distribution.

The amount Poles spent on helping during the first three months of the war was higher than the amount spent on charity in 2021 as a whole. More people spent any amount on helping refugees (77%) than on charity in 2021 (70 percent). The contributions were also higher: 14% of people spent over PLN 500 on charity in 2021, 20% spent this amount on helping refugees. The results of our study are consistent with the results of other studies, in terms of the scale and size of Poles' financial involvement before the war (Chart 6), which significantly lends credence to the method used in our study.

Chart 6. Financial support for charitable causes in 2021 (% of respondents)



Source: prepared by PEI based on survey results and the report *ABR SESTA et al.* (2021).

The total funds spent on charitable causes in 2021 amounted to around two-thirds of the amount spent on helping refugees during the first three months of the war. Using the same calculation method, Poles' charitable aid in 2021 exceeded PLN 3.9 billion (EUR 0.8 billion) and could amount to approximately PLN 7.3 billion (EUR 1.6 billion).⁸ However, this figure carries an even greater risk of error than the one estimating assistance for refugees. This stems from two main factors. Firstly, the values provided by respondents may have been even less accurate because they concern the more distant past and the sum of payments over the course of a year. Secondly, for 2021, it was not possible to estimate the parameters of the distribution that would describe the data well, so the estimates for the last interval with the highest contributions remain uncertain. Nevertheless, the clear difference that emerges is another illustration of Poles' unprecedented level of engagement when helping people from Ukraine.

⁸ Estimates of the probable values were carried out using the methodology used to estimate Poles' spending on helping refugees. For a detailed description of the methodology, see the appendix.


Overall we estimate that total value of annual spending assigned by the Polish government to helping refugees in 2022 and of Poles' private spending during the first 3 months of the war in relation to helping refugees together amount to PLN 25.4 billion (EUR 5.45 billion) which is an equivalent of 0.97% of Poland's GDP in 2021.

Volunteering

The influx of refugees from Ukraine to Poland prompted some people to volunteer their own time to help refugees. 20% of the respondents said they helped specific people sort things out in Poland, and 17% volunteered as part of organised aid efforts. Within possible categories of voluntary work some respondents also declared helping refugees sort things out, especially formalities. This subcategory of volunteering and the category of "help sort things out" might seem similar, but only 26 people out of over 2,000 of the respondents said they did both. Therefore, if we take into account Poles who helped Ukrainians sort out various matters (official, formal and legal) and other types of volunteering, around 35% of respondents were involved in these activities. The differences between volunteering based on formal and legal assistance and helping refugees sort out various matters may consist in the issue of organising this assistance (respondents might consider volunteering participating in more organized actions, and help sorting out matters an individual activity) or the scale (volunteering as help requiring greater engagement in terms of the time and the matters' importance, the second category could include assistance with minor matters), among other things.

The fact that respondents said they spent time helping refugees (including as part of volunteering) does not mean permanent involvement in the activities of organisations that help refugees. The data should be interpreted as indicators of citizens' *ad hoc* involvement in aid efforts organised by local communities, institutions and organisations operating based on the principle of "all hands on deck". This is shown by the fact that the **largest percentage of respondents (65%) said they were involved in voluntary activities for a short amount of time, up to 5 hours per week, and only 9% over 10 hours per week** (Chart 7).

Chart 7. Hours per week spent volunteering during the first three months of the war (%)




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Poles' high level of involvement in volunteering was complemented by the variety of forms and types of activity. Most of the initiatives and activities were only undertaken at the local level, within local communities focused around schools, parishes, housing estates or social media, for example. At some point, activities such as baking a cake or shopping for new neighbours from Ukraine became commonplace in neighbourhood groups on social media, although this was not usually covered by the media.

An important area of volunteers' work was organising help for refugees at railway stations in Poland's largest cities, where they found themselves temporarily. Volunteers helped provide information, communicating with refugees in Ukrainian and Russian, and organise logistics, receiving and delivering food and other essentials, and then distributing them. Volunteers' work at places with beds for refugees, such as Hala Torwar in Warsaw, was also similar. However, it is worth emphasising that volunteering is not only about working in one place. Many of the collections of goods and food took place at points scattered around various neighbourhoods and places in cities, so some volunteers were responsible for transporting the donations to where they were needed.

Chart 8. Popularity of various forms of volunteering among Poles who helped Ukrainian refugees in this way



Note: the percentages add up to over 100 as respondents could pick more than one option.
Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Volunteering and sorting out matters included supporting refugees once they had found an apartment in Poland, too. These kinds of activities included language courses organised in many places around Poland, legal assistance, helping organise educational activities for children, shopping, help with logistics and transport, or organising veterinary assistance for animals brought over from Ukraine. Help looking for a job was also important,

complementing initiatives by employers. Importantly, this was not limited to jobs that do not require complicated skills – work that the person is over-qualified for, which is typical among migrants and refugees – as many Polish universities offered posts to academics, teachers, specialists and analysts from Ukraine (www12).

Most of the work done by volunteers was organisational (74%, Chart 8).

In our study, this included all kinds of assistance at reception points (such as stations), organising collections and transporting donations, work at accommodation points, and so on. The next two categories, which add up to 18%, are transporting refugees (for example, from the border to various cities) and organising courses and training. 8% concerned legal and formal assistance; that is, help dealing with administrative matters and public institutions, or looking for work or housing.

Why are we helping?

Researchers assume that the **main motivation for helping is altruism combined with positive effects for the individual, such as improving well-being, increasing self-esteem and avoiding remorse**. People are limited altruists and rather than being egoists they are typically characterised by bounded self-interest. One of the key factors modifying selfish motivations and increasing people's willingness to act in an altruistic way is a **sense of justice**. Research shows that people are able to incur significant economic costs to achieve a result that they consider fair (Güth & Tietz, 1990; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). The need to achieve fair solutions is additionally reinforced by the evolutionary propensity act altruistically, which in many situations leads to solutions that benefit one's own group or the entire population. The tendency to help may also be linked to the empathy we feel towards others, and a desire to avoid self-accusation if we do not help others, or a desire to increase our self-esteem by helping other people.


An important factor influencing the willingness to help is also the awareness that we could become victims of violence, too (the **"it could have been me"** effect). The closer we are to the place of the tragedy, the easier it is to imagine that we could become its victims (Zagefka, 2017). If it is easy for people to imagine developments in which they are the victims, the number and intensity of assistance will increase. We can assume that, in the case of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the following was undoubtedly important: the sense of the conflict's proximity, compounded by the history of Poland's relations with Russia. The fact that the Poles were also invaded by the Russians in the past may have made it much easier for them to put themselves in the place of the Ukrainians fighting for their freedom and statehood. A **similar historical and political past** may therefore make it easier for people to choose between helping and remaining passive.

Hosting refugees as a unique form of assistance

An important area of assistance was welcoming refugees into one's own apartment or house, which 7% of the respondents said they did. This form of assistance deserves special attention, mainly because the accommodation provided by private individuals helped Poland take in such a large number of people. Administrative data shows that, by July 2, when there were already 1.207 million people registered in the PESEL system., 357,000 people had stayed in organised accommodation (Otwarte Dane, 2022; www13). This means that most of the refugees in Poland at the time used private accommodation, either by finding it on the market (mainly renting) or by living at someone's house or apartment temporarily or permanently.

Interestingly, the size of the place where someone lives (city, medium or small town, or village) did not significantly differentiate respondents in terms of their willingness to host refugees. However, there has been some differentiation at the regional level in terms of people willingness to host refugees (it should be noted that this is not only a matter of hospitality, but also, most likely, the sheer number of refugees who arrived in a given place, as well as the possibility of staying at the flats of Ukrainians who were already in Poland when Russia invaded Ukraine in February)

Map 2. Percentage of people who said they hosted one or more refugees at their apartment or house (by region)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.


The map above shows the regions in which people were the most willing to host refugees in their apartments and houses. In the Podkarpackie region, more than 1 in 8 inhabitants helped Ukrainians in this way. In the Świętokrzyskie, Mazowieckie and Pomorskie regions, the percentage was around 10%. The map also shows refugees' potential route, from the border in the Podkarpackie region, where the demand for accommodation was very high, towards Warsaw, the main transport junction. The route also runs through the Lublin region, where the percentage of hosts was also quite high (over 8%). After that, the refugees probably spread out around Poland to a greater extent. Comparing Map 2 with Map 1 (which shows where Ukrainians were registered in the PESEL system), we see that a relatively low percentage of people in the Śląskie or Zachodniopomorskie regions hosted refugees, despite the large number of people who arrived there. Perhaps these were refugees who had stayed with people in regions closer to Ukraine earlier and then found a place to live in other parts of the country.

This is probably why Map 1 indicates that a low number of Ukrainians registered in the Podkarpackie or Świętokrzyskie regions – these were probably transit zones (where Ukrainians had to spend the night, though) before travelling west. A low percentage of people who said they hosted refugees should not always be equated with a lack of hospitality. Many refugees tried to arrange a place on their own, for example, by renting a flat, which was probably easier in highly-urbanised Upper Silesia or in the vicinity of Łódź. Housing conditions may also have determined refugees' physical ability to spend the night in a given household. Add to this the differences in effort by the local authorities when organising municipal facilities for refugees; if, in a given location, the public sector prepared a lot of space for Ukrainians, the demand for space in private homes was lower. One should also remember the large group of Ukrainians who have settled in Poland in recent years who, in many cases, were the first point of contact for their compatriots fleeing the war.

Who helped the most

Naturally, Poles' level of involvement in helping refugees varied. Some were very active in several areas of assistance, dedicating their time, financial resources and organisational capacities. Others were involved less frequently or to a lesser extent. There were also people who did not help at all. To characterise this diversity as clearly as possible and illustrate it quantitatively, we divided respondents into four categories: from strongly committed to providing assistance to completely uninvolved in supporting refugees. The selection criteria and the size of each group are presented on Infographic 3.

Infographic 3. Categories of engagement in helping refugees with % of respondents in each category




*) Out of 7 possible areas (purchasing items for refugees, donating money, helping refugees sort out matters, volunteering, hosting refugees, hiring a refugees, transporting refugees from the border).

Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

The largest percentage of Poles (44%) helped refugees to a relatively low extent. In our study, we characterise it as meeting one of the following conditions: engagement in one or two areas of assistance (out of seven possible), spending up to PLN 500 (EUR 107) on helping refugees, or volunteering for up to 10 hours per week (at the peak moment of involvement). 33% of Poles contributed more resources and/or time. 19% of Poles helped to a moderate extent; that is, during the period studied, they spent PLN 500-1000 (EUR 107-214) on helping refugees or volunteered for more than 10 hours per week, or participated in three types of assistance. A slightly smaller group (14% of respondents) were strongly engaged. People in this category met one of three conditions: they spent over PLN 1,000 on helping refugees, hosted them, or were involved in four areas of assistance. 23% of Poles did not help refugees in any way during the period analysed.

Below, we present the demographic and social composition of each of the categories.

Infographic 4. Demographic and social profile of people strongly involved in helping refugees




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Among the 14% of respondents most involved in helping refugees, people in the 65+ age group made up the smallest percentage. People with higher education made up the largest percentage.

The data collected by us shows that people under the age of 50 made up the largest group among people who hosted refugees. In the youngest group (20-34 years old), the percentage exceeded 10%. In the 35-49 age group it was almost 10%, and in the 65+ age group it was below 2% (Chart 9).


Chart 9. People who hosted refugees (by age, %)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

The moderately involved group – people who spent PLN 500-1000 on supporting refugees, volunteered over 10h per week, or were engaged in three forms of assistance simultaneously – contained 19% of respondents (Infographic 5).

Infographic 5. Demographic and social profile of people moderately involved in helping refugees




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

The oldest and youngest respondents make up the smallest share of this category. Like in the strongly involved category, the dominant group is people with higher education and those who were socially engaged before the war.

The largest percentage of Poles (44%) were minimally involved engaged in helping refugees (Infographic 5). The oldest people (57%) are dominant here, and there was also a high share of people in the 50-64 age group. Unlike in the other categories, there is a relatively large difference between women (49%) and men (39%). In this group, people with vocational education were the most numerous, and those with higher education the least numerous. More than half the people minimally involved had never had contact with Ukrainians before the war.


Infographic 6. Demographic and social profile of people minimally involved in helping refugees



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Just under a quarter of society was not involved in helping refugees. The percentage of the youngest respondents is relatively high: 20-34 years (27%). More men (28%) than women (19%) did not help. Only 16% of people with higher education did not help (in this category, the percentage of people with secondary or vocational education is at least 10 pp higher). 39% of those who did not help had not been socially engaged before the war. Almost a third of them had not had any contact with Ukrainians before the war.

Infographic 7. Demographic and social profile of people not involved in helping refugees



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Comparing these categories of engagement shows that, **among younger people, there was the highest percentage of strongly involved people, but also the highest percentage of people who did not help – 27% of people in the 20-34 age group did not help the refugees at all** (but 18% were strongly involved). Around one-fifth of people in the 50-64 age group and a similar percentage of people in the 65+ age group did not help. This means that almost 80% of people in these age groups helped refugees in some way, most often with a low level of involvement.


Women were involved in helping refugees more often than men. 28% of male respondents said they did not help at all, compared to only 19% of women. This gap of less than 10 pp mainly influenced the difference in the “low involvement” category, where the gap between the sexes is 10 pp. In the strongly-involved and moderate categories, the percentage of men and women was similar.

Our findings are consistent with the results of other studies in which researchers sought to identify factors that influence people’s propensity to help others. It turns out that gender matters. Men are more likely to help in situations that require physical strength, whereas women are more likely to engage in volunteering, community work or long-term care (Becker and Eagly, 2004; Eagly and Becker, 2005).

The level of education is one of the most important demographic features associated with the scale of involvement – the percentages of people who did not help at all show that people with higher education were more involved in helping, by around 10 pp compared to people in the other groups. Among respondents with higher education, the percentage of strongly engaged people is also significantly higher (20% of respondents from this group). There are no big differences between people with secondary and vocational education.

Income has a clear impact on the level of involvement: the higher an individual’s income, the more involved he or she was in helping refugees, which is visible at almost every level of involvement (Chart 10). Among people with the highest income (over PLN 5000 net), the percentage who helped refugees to the greatest extent was three times higher than among people with the lowest income (below PLN 2,000 net). This conclusion is intuitive, as one of the forms of help in our survey was financial support; people with higher earnings have more resources to donate. However, it is worth noting that, even among people who earned less than PLN 2000, assistance was quite common; only 26% of people in this group did not help at all. **This may reflect the massive scale of humanitarian engagement in Polish society.**

Chart 10. Level of engagement in helping refugees based on individual income (%)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

There are no big differences in the degree of involvement depending on the size of the place where a person lives. Both among the inhabitants of rural areas and small- and medium-sized towns, around 30% of people were strongly or moderately engaged. In cities, this percentage was slightly higher: 39%. At first glance, it might seem that city dwellers were the main group with the opportunity to help refugees – and that the effect would therefore be visible in the results. However, inhabitants of smaller towns and villages also found ways and opportunities to help refugees from Ukraine.

In addition to demographic characteristics, **social engagement before the war seems to have had an impact on assistance to refugees and its intensity.** The very binary distinction between people who spent time helping others before February 24 correlates with the level of humanitarian engagement helping people fleeing Ukraine. Between these two groups (those who were involved in charity before the war and those who were not), the difference in the percentage of people who did not help Ukrainians at all is as much as 30 pp (Chart A8 in the appendix).

People's willingness to host refugees is also associated with the experience supporting social initiatives before the war. People without this experience were much less likely to host people fleeing Ukraine (Chart A3 in the appendix). Between people who did not support charitable initiatives before the war and those who did so very often, the difference in the percentage of people who hosted refugees amounts to nearly 18 pp.

This result is consistent with the conclusions of research on altruistic behaviour (Niebuur et al., 2018). If someone has previously helped others in a disinterested way, it is more likely that they will devote their time and resources to initiatives designed to helping people again. People who have helped in the past will be statistically more likely to help in the future. This shows


how important it is to encourage more people to engage in voluntary work, for instance, in order to increase society's capacity to handle crises, such as the current situation with refugees.

Contact with Ukrainians before the war had a similar impact as support for charitable initiatives before the war. **Frequent contacts before 24 February were linked with greater involvement in helping refugees: as many as 22% of respondents with this experience were strongly involved, and just 17% of them did not help refugees at all.** In the group of people without previous contact with people from Ukraine, these percentages were 9% and 28%, respectively. One can discuss the channels of the causal influence of this pre-war experience. On the one hand, having people who left Ukraine for Poland in your broad circle of acquaintances creates a natural opportunity to help – Ukrainian friends probably organised many aid efforts themselves or even brought over their family to Poland, so it was easier to get involved. On the other hand, the influence of contact and personal experiences at the level of empathy should not be overlooked. It is easier for us to show compassion and solidarity (and act on these feelings) towards people who are not completely alien to us.

Earlier contact with foreigners – including Ukrainians – was also a significant factor related to willingness to host people. People who have foreigners in their environment were more likely to offer their apartment or house to Ukrainians who needed of a roof over their heads. Between the group that came into contact with foreigners in their environment often or very often before the war and the group that did not, the difference was almost 10 pp (Chart A4 in the appendix).

The findings presented in Chart 11 may be considered complementary to the above. People cut off from the news about the fate of refugees from Ukraine were visibly less involved in helping refugees. In this group, the majority (54%) did not help Ukrainians at all – a rare occurrence (although 14% of them were strongly involved in helping them). In the group of respondents following the news about refugees to the lowest extent, the percentage of people who did not help at all amounted to just 18%. The differences between the other groups of people, categorized based on their interest in refugees' fate, are difficult to interpret. In this case, the dependencies do not seem to follow a linear trend, although we see that people who obtain news regularly are the most involved in helping.

Chart 11. Level of involvement in helping refugees and level of interest in the news about the refugees (%)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

The latter conclusion clearly shows that an important factor increasing people’s willingness to help – the effect of which has been particularly visible during the war in Ukraine – is significant **exposure of the effects of the conflict in the media** (BIT, 2020). The large amount of information, in particular videos and photos showing the daily hardships of refugees crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border, means that refugees’ situation has been influencing Poles’ image of reality for a relatively long time. In this way, it has defined what is important, what problems we should face, and in which order. The media reports evoked the need to help people in need, and contact with them – or the experience of offering assistance on a massive scale – was the object of the media’s attention. There was a natural feedback loop between media content and efforts to help.


Narratives and assistance

One of the important psychological and social factors influencing people’s actions are the narratives present in their surroundings. The role of narratives (roughly understood as stories with a causal and temporal structure) is to structure “raw” data from the external world into meaningful and behaviour-influencing information (Johnson, Bilovich, & Tuckett, 2022).

In Poland, it was possible to create a constellation of narratives fostering help for refugees and, more broadly, for Ukraine. There were many people behind this success, as pro-Ukrainian narratives arose both from the grassroots, naturally, and on the public sector’s initiative, and were also clear in the media. Of course, there have been, and still are, counter-narratives, mainly based on identifying individual costs and upsetting the sense of security. Nevertheless, the struggle in the narrative sphere during the first months of the war was won by stories of compassion, heroism and the need to help Ukrainians. Although it is difficult to provide conclusive

evidence confirming this thesis, the Google Trends tool, which records the popularity of various terms in this search engine (the popularity scale of 0-100 shows the relative search intensity of the terms being compared in the search engine calculated by Google, rather than the absolute number of searches), offers a certain image.

Chart 12. Popularity of selected terms in the Google search engine in Poland between 01.02.2022 and 01.06.2022 (daily data)



Source: prepared by PEI based on Google Trends data.

During the first week of the conflict, the slogan of helping Ukrainians reached peak popularity – this is a good illustration for the humanitarian impulse among Poles. Right after that, a several-week period of searches for "refugees" began, which might reflect a desire to find information about assistance but, more broadly, an interest in the fate of those fleeing a neighbouring country. It is worth noting that a term conveying a sense of danger ("shelter" – people searching for this term might have wanted to find out where to flee to in the case of war, which could indicate a feeling of anxiety) surged in popularity at the start of the war, but returned to its pre-war level quite quickly.

The analysis of the narrative can be considered a supplement to the behavioural background of the tendency to help visible in Polish society since the start of the war. In this sense, narratives can perform two functions. Firstly, they help make sense of a multitude of information; in this case, mainly emphasising the difficult situation that Ukrainians found themselves in and the moral obligation to help. Secondly, narratives coordinate the actions of the community, first unifying thinking about a given situation and then suggesting similar actions in response to it. They can therefore contribute to herd behaviour – which was favourable in this case – such as volunteering and fundraising *en masse*, and so on. Prosocial and moralising narratives can be catalysts for prosocial attitudes (Hillenbrand, Veriina, 2018; Harrs, Müller, Rockenbach, 2021; Bénabou, Falk, Tirole, 2018).

Narratives and the availability heuristic

The availability heuristic may be one of the things responsible for the mechanism of narrative creation. This is the natural, self-functioning, and sustained process of creating widely-shared beliefs. In the age of 24/7 broadcasting, cascades of accessibility are easier than ever. Repeating certain information or presenting a specific description of the facts in the traditional media and on social media makes the information or descriptions seem obvious. If certain material is constantly repeated in the media then that interpretation or description is considered the only possible and universally applicable one, for reputational and informational reasons (Kuran, Sunstein, 1999).

The informational element consists in us starting to rely on the evaluation and judgements of other members of society. The reputational element – or the reputation cascade, as it is known in the literature on the subject – consists in adopting the opinion that prevails in society on a given topic, especially when it is repeated with great intensity, and even when we do not share the opinion. Succumbing to the reputation cascade is beneficial because it earns you the respect of other members of society. Our reputation is strengthened at the expense of our limited ability to express our beliefs.

In this sense, the availability heuristic, together with the elements of the reputational and informational cascade, can contribute to the imposition and dissemination of prevailing narratives in society. As a result, these narratives can be a starting point for assessing the decisions and actions of the public and the authorities.


Assistance for refugees – changes over time

The weakening of the scale of the Russian offensive in Ukraine led to a marked slowdown in the number of people fleeing the country, followed by more people returning than leaving. In the context of social and state assistance for refugees, this meant that the situation gradually normalised, especially in terms of the greater use of formal channels of assistance, provided by organizations and institutions, and less use of informal channels based on spontaneous and grassroots initiatives. On the one hand, this shift in emphasis from informal channels and the citizens' grassroots involvement to greater use of formal agendas, gave the people who had spent their own time and financial resources on helping refugees. On the other hand, it provided an opportunity to include the aid for refugees in the Polish welfare state. The fundamental factor that made this shift from the first to the second phase possible was the adoption of the so-called special law on assistance for refugees from Ukraine (www14).

In subsequent weeks, assistance provided by Poles decreased slightly, but remained relatively high. The largest decrease concerned the two most popular categories of aid. Right after the start of the war, 51% of Poles bought items for refugees; after two months, this has decreased to 39%. At the beginning, 46% of Poles made cash donations; this then dropped to 33%. Chart 13 shows the decline in intensity of Poles' initially record-break involvement in helping refugees two months after the Russian invasion.

Some people stopped helping at all, while others scaled back their involvement. As the refugees in Poland become increasingly independent and the sense that help is needed weakens, engagement in organising support will continue to decline.

Chart 13. Changes in the intensity of engagement over time, by area of assistance (%)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Why are we helping less?

It is incredibly difficult to unequivocally state the causes of the declining intensity of the assistance provided not only to refugees, but also to patients or other victims of long-term situations that result in a large number of people in need.

The following can obviously be mentioned: limited material and organisational resources, the conviction that someone else should get more involved, a decline in interest in the victims as people need to take care of their immediate surroundings, fatigue, and a change in how much help they think is still needed. Apart from these possible causes, it is worth drawing attention to so-called moral exhaustion (www15). In the literature on the subject, this is defined as a situation in which we face with the need to fulfil a large number of moral obligations, but over time have less energy and willingness to continue a certain behaviour with the same commitment.

In recent years, it has been emphasised that widespread moral exhaustion already appeared in society during the coronavirus pandemic, when previously morally-neutral behaviour – such as visiting loved ones – became a moral issue, in the sense that these visits could expose relatives to COVID-19. The number of moral decisions increased significantly, resulting in the emergence of moral exhaustion and the desire to avoid them. It therefore seems that, in the long term, people are not prepared to constantly help others in need of support.

What's next – current and future challenges

Over the course of the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War, the scope of assistance, the scale of needs, and the entities meant to provide it have changed at various stages. Examining the scale of help for refugees, one should also take into account the stage and degree of advancement of the ongoing refugee crisis, as well as expectations concerning when the conflict will end. The needs, their scale, how they are met, and the type of entities providing support will vary at different stages.

The data above reflects the **stage of spontaneous assistance and, in part, the adaptation stage**, which, depending on how the situation on the front-line develops and whether the refugees need to stay in Poland, will gradually turn into **the integration stage**. The spontaneous aid stage was dominated by grassroots initiatives in Polish society, an unprecedented, rapid social effort on a massive scale, and *ad hoc* support for these processes from local governments and the central authorities. At first, right after Russia invaded Ukraine, the priority was to provide clothes, food, hygiene products and toys for children, as well as to finance current expenses. Logistics were equally important: providing refugees with transport from the Polish-Ukrainian border to cities and towns, and then arranging travel for them within Poland. Provide millions of refugees with accommodation was a heroic challenges. This huge organisational effort was made possible by the unprecedented social mobilisation.

With time, the number of Ukrainian refugees based in Poland, but also those for whom the country was just a stop on their journey, has changed. Their needs have evolved, too. At the adaptation stage, the role of the state increases and the role of civil society decreases. This is the stage at which refugees are incorporated into the state and welfare system. They are granted access to the infrastructure needed to access basic services within the existing public policy framework. Given that most of the refugees are women, children or elderly people, they first needed to receive access to health-care, the education system and the ability to look for a job legally. This is also the stage at which, during the initial phase, the state could and should support the Poles helping refugees.

The second stage of assistance therefore requires other resources, institutional support, and much higher financial outlays, which should be provided in a systematic, continuous and controlled manner.

More than four months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it can be assumed with certainty that the refugee crisis in Poland is in the adaptation stage.

At the next stage – **integration** – many different entities, including state institutions, think tanks and NGOs working on immigration, will need to develop appropriate tools and mechanisms enabling the refugees' permanent and effective inclusion in Polish society. The final stage requires

coordination between many entities to ensure social cohesion, reduce social tensions between the people who came from Ukraine and Polish society, and enable smooth integration at schools, public institutions, workplaces and wherever there is close contact between the refugees and Polish citizens.



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Methodological appendix

Description of the sample

The sample was made up of 2200 Poles aged 20 and above. The survey was carried out using the telephone interview method (CATI). The larger sample size was used to ensure representativeness at the level of individual sub-groups, based on the size of the place of residence or demographic profile. The survey was carried out between 25 April 2022 and 19 May 2022 by two research companies.

Random quota sampling was used to select the sample, taking into account gender, age and the size of the place of residence, for which certain minimum amounts of representativeness in relation to the population being studied were assumed.

Table A1. Socio-demographic profile of the sample studied

Gender	
Female	52.4
Male	47.6
Age	
20-34	23.2
35-49	29.6
50-64	23.6
65+	23.5
Size of place of residence	
Village	40.2
Town with up to 20,000 inhabitants	13.0
Town with 20,000-100,000 inhabitants	19.2
City with over 100,000 inhabitants	27.6
Education	
Primary or middle school	12.9
Vocational	27.0
Secondary	34.4
Higher	25.7


Source: prepared by PEI.

In the first part of the study, in order to fill out 1,200 survey questionnaires, 4,500 people were contacted, and a significant share of the interview attempts resulted in no contact with the respondent. Out of 45,000 attempts to conduct interviews, 9,291 ended with refusal to participate in the study. In the second part of the study, in which 1000 interviews were carried out, the sampling frame contained 95,902 individuals, and 14,362 telephone calls were made for 1000 interviews.

Estimated value of financial engagement in helping refugees

In our analyses, we used three methods to estimate the value of the financial aid provided by Polish citizens. The main difficulty here is the fact that the continuous variable used to measure individual contributions is not directly observable. The survey only gave us an ordinal variable determining the interval that each contribution was in. The distribution of this variable, disaggregated at the level of individual złoty (assuming equal probability densities in each interval), is presented in Chart A1 below.

Chart A1. Disaggregated values of the amount Poles spent on helping refugees



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

In our calculations, we adopted different assumptions about the distribution of this variable within individual groups of respondents. In the first variant (V1), we assumed that within each of the groups with a given level of involvement, the most typical value, which would minimise the size of errors, would be the interval's arithmetic mean.

One could debate this assumption, pointing out that it means recognising *de facto* that, inside each interval, the expected value of a hidden continuous variable is equal to its median and also its dominant, and the skewness of the distribution is equal to zero. Therefore, as a robustness check in the second variant (V2), we adopted different assumptions regarding the reference values used in the estimates. For individual intervals, as reference values, we adopted median values as those dividing the respondent population into equal parts. At the same time, we made the assumption that the distribution of a hidden continuous variable is characterised by asymmetry, expressed as a shift of the median values with respect to the arithmetic means of the distributions. Taking into account that the medians of the hidden variable for individual intervals are not directly observable, we assumed their values in a way that reflects the asymmetry of the distribution in particular parts of it: left-skewness in the first part of the distribution (for the PLN 0-100 interval, a median of 80% of the arithmetic length of the interval), symmetry in the second interval (PLN 100-500, a median of 50% of the arithmetic length of the interval), slight right-skewness in the third interval (500-1000 PLN, a median of 40% of the arithmetic length of the interval) and strong right-skewness in the final interval (PLN 1000 and above, median of 30% of the arithmetic length of the interval).

In the final variant, using numerical methods, we found the continuous distribution density function, which maps the values of the survey in individual intervals with the greatest accuracy. After testing various functions, we chose the log-normal form of the distribution as the best fit for the data. We optimised the distribution parameters in such a way that the sums in each interval were as close as possible to the values obtained from the survey (only for non-zero values of financial aid).

This approach is especially useful for estimating the values in the last interval (the one with the highest contributions), especially at the end of the entire distribution. The group of people who spent the highest amounts was the smallest. There is therefore a high risk of error when estimating the total financial assistance from this group based on a representative survey. Our approach, in which we use the density function of a typical distribution, eliminates this risk to some extent.

The parameters of the log-normal distribution obtained in the optimisation process are as follows: $\mu = 5.396$ and $\sigma^2 = 1.302$. The distribution obtained is presented in diagram A2. When optimising the parameters, the objective function we set is the minimization of the sum of the absolute values of the differences between the percentages obtained from the distribution and the percentages from the sample for four quota intervals. For the intervals "below PLN 100" and "PLN 100-499", identical values were obtained (with accuracy to two decimal places). The next interval, "PLN 500-999",


Table A2. Description of the assumptions made in the three variants of the estimates

Spending intervals	Percentage of sample (% of respondents in a given category)	Number of adult Poles	Estimated number of Poles in a given spending category (% of sample * number of adult Poles)	Minimal variant			Mean variant			Median variant		
				Assumed value of spending in the group	Estimated size of spending in a given group (in PLN)		Assumed value of spending in the group	Estimated size of spending in a given group (in PLN)		Median relative to the length of the interval	Value of the median	Estimated size of spending in a given group (in PLN)
0	0.23	31,311,374	7,201,616	0	0		0	0		brak	0	0
Up to PLN 100	0.21	31,311,374	6,575,389	1	6,575,389		50	328,769,427		80% compartment length	80	526,031,083
PLN 100-499	0.36	31,311,374	11,272,095	100	1,127,209,464		300	3,381,628,392		50% compartment length	299.5	3,375,992,345
PLN 500-999	0.12	31,311,374	3,757,365	500	1,878,682,440		750	2,818,023,660		40% compartment length	699.6	2,628,652,470
PLN 1000 or more	0.08	31,311,374	2,504,910	1000	2,504,909,920		1250	3,131,137,400		30% compartment length	1150	2,880,646,408
Estimated total amount of expenses				5,517,377,213			9,659,558,879			9,411,322,306		

Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

was understated by 1.8 pp, while the final one, “PLN 1,000 or more”, was overstated by the same amount (Table A3). This is because the distribution cannot be made to fit with greater accuracy, but this is not very important for the final result.

Chart A2. Log normal distribution for financial assistance for refugees



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.


Table A3. Continuous distribution of financial assistance for refugees

Spending interval	Percentage of sample (for non-zero values)	Percentage of sample (for non-zero values)	Percentage of sample (overall)	Percentage of distribution (overall)	Estimated amount spent in a given group (in PLN)
< PLN 100	27.0	27.0	20.8	20.8	266,081,797
PLN 100-499	46.5	46.5	35.8	35.8	2,123,570,317
PLN 500-999	16.0	14.2	12.3	10.9	1,849,714,284
PLN 1000 or more	10.5	12.3	8.1	9.4	4,811,833,698
Total amount spent (in PLN)					9,051,200,095

Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.


Additional charts and data

Chart A3. Hospitality toward refugees vs. frequency of involvement in social initiatives before the war (%)




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Chart A4. Hospitality toward refugees vs. contact with foreigners before the war (%)




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Chart A5. Level of engagement in providing assistance to refugees according to gender (%)




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Chart A6. Level of engagement in providing assistance to refugees according to age (%)




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Chart A7. Level of engagement in providing assistance to refugees according to level of education (%)




Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Chart A8. Level of engagement in providing assistance to refugees vs. support for social initiatives before the war (%)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Chart A9. Level of engagement in providing assistance to refugees vs. contacts with Ukrainians before the war (%)



Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.

Table A4. Statics and confidence intervals for individual engagement categories

Category	Percentage of the total number in the category	Confidence interval	
		Lower bound	Upper bound
Female			
Strong engagement	13	11	15
Moderate engagement	19	16	22
Relatively low engagement	49	46	53
No engagement	19	16	21
Male			
Strong engagement	15	13	17
Moderate engagement	18	16	21
Relatively low engagement	39	36	42
No engagement	28	25	31
Age: 20-34			
Strong engagement	18	15	22
Moderate engagement	17	14	21
Relatively low engagement	38	33	43
No engagement	27	23	32
Age: 35-49			
Strong engagement	16	13	19
Moderate engagement	22	18	26
Relatively low engagement	38	34	43
No engagement	24	20	28
Age: 50-64			
Strong engagement	14	11	17
Moderate engagement	20	17	24
Relatively low engagement	46	41	51
No engagement	20	16	24

Age: 65 and older			
Strong engagement	7	5	10
Moderate engagement	15	11	18
Relatively low engagement	57	52	62
No engagement	21	17	26
Education: vocational and primary			
Strong engagement	10	8	14
Moderate engagement	17	14	21
Relatively low engagement	48	43	52
No engagement	25	21	29
Education: secondary			
Strong engagement	13	11	16
Moderate engagement	16	14	19
Relatively low engagement	44	40	48
No engagement	26	23	30
Education: higher			
Strong engagement	20	18	23
Moderate engagement	24	22	27
Relatively low engagement	40	37	43
No engagement	16	13	18
Net individual income: up to PLN 2000			
Strong engagement	9	6	12
Moderate engagement	12	9	16
Relatively low engagement	53	48	59
No engagement	26	21	31
Net individual income: PLN 2000-3000			
Strong engagement	11	8	15
Moderate engagement	17	13	21
Relatively low engagement	48	43	53
No engagement	24	20	29
Net individual income: PLN 3000-4000			
Strong engagement	14	11	18
Moderate engagement	21	17	26
Relatively low engagement	44	38	49
No engagement	21	17	26
Net individual income: PLN 4000-5000			
Strong engagement	15	11	21
Moderate engagement	26	20	33
Relatively low engagement	40	33	48
No engagement	18	13	24
Net individual income: above PLN 5000			
Strong engagement	28	24	34
Moderate engagement	25	20	30
Relatively low engagement	33	28	38
No engagement	14	10	19

Charitable activities before the Russian invasion			
Strong engagement	7	5	9
Moderate engagement	9	8	12
Relatively low engagement	45	41	49
No engagement	39	36	43
No charitable activities before the Russian invasion			
Strong engagement	20	18	23
Moderate engagement	27	24	30
Relatively low engagement	44	41	47
No engagement	9	7	11
Frequent and very frequent contact with Ukrainians before the war			
Strong engagement	22	19	26
Moderate engagement	25	21	28
Relatively low engagement	37	32	41
No engagement	17	13	20
Sporadic or infrequent contact with Ukrainians before the war			
Strong engagement	13	11	16
Moderate engagement	23	19	27
Relatively low engagement	43	38	47
No engagement	21	18	25
No contact with Ukrainians before the war			
Strong engagement	9	7	11
Moderate engagement	12	10	15
Relatively low engagement	51	47	54
No engagement	28	25	32
Regular following of the news about the refugees			
Strong engagement	18	15	21
Moderate engagement	26	22	30
Relatively low engagement	44	39	49
No engagement	12	9	16
Occasional following of the news about the refugees			
Strong engagement	10	7	15
Moderate engagement	20	15	27
Relatively low engagement	46	39	54
No engagement	23	17	30
Regular following of the news about the refugees at the start of war, and less frequent later on			
Strong engagement	13	9	19
Moderate engagement	26	20	33
Relatively low engagement	46	38	54
No engagement	15	10	22
Random reading or listening to the news about the refugees when they appear on the radio, TV or the Internet			
Strong engagement	8	4	14
Moderate engagement	16	10	24
Relatively low engagement	58	48	67
No engagement	18	12	26

No interest in the news about the refugees			
Strong engagement	14	3	43
Moderate engagement	17	6	41
Relatively low engagement	15	5	38
No engagement	54	32	75

Note: lower and upper bounds refer to confidence interval estimated with 95% confidence level.
Source: prepared by PEI based on the results of the survey.



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The Polish Economic Institute

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