Key Findings of PEI's report "Unlocking Nuclear Energy in Poland: Policy, Regulatory and Industry Incentives"

Published: 09/04/2026

Poland’s nuclear pathway is framed by a multi-layered policy architecture (national strategies plus EU planning obligations) and an increasingly complex market reality shaped by rapid renewables deployment, looming coal retirements, rising electricity demand from electrification, and the competitiveness needs of energy-intensive industry.

Multiple demand projections suggest a substantial rise in electricity consumption in Poland, from 169 TWh in 2024 to potentially 240-267 TWh in 2040 and up to 345-471 TWh by 2050 depending on electrification assumptions (electrolysis, EVs, heat pumps, data centers). This growth compounds an already fragile adequacy outlook driven by aging coal capacity and grid constraints which can result in a possible generation gap in early 2030s, with reliability metrics such as LOLE (Loss of Load Expectation) inceasing in the coming years.

In interviews – especially with energy-intensive industries – the demand signal is clear and consistent: what industry needs is stable, predictable, affordable low-carbon electricity and heat. The technology is secondary to the outcome. This matters because it defines nuclear’s value proposition in Poland as system stability and industrial competitiveness, rather than “nuclear as an end in itself.” It is important to note that most of our Energy Intensive Industries (EII) respondents represented the largest national companies. Only one medium-sized industrial firm agreed to be interviewed; most production companies were not yet interested in SMRs.

At the same time, interview material highlights a practical asymmetry in today’s incentive landscape: many stakeholders perceive current market rules and support structures as structurally easier to navigate for renewables than for capital-intensive firm generation. That perception feeds skepticism about near-term SMR economics and timelines – even among actors interested in SMRs for siting flexibility and industrial heat.

Because nuclear economics are highly sensitive to financing conditions, many of our interviews repeatedly points to the need for state-enabled risk sharing but calibrated to project type. However, there is a concern that poorly designed SMR support could be interpreted as indirect industrial aid, triggering European Commission scrutiny and delays. Any incentive framework therefore needs to be both investable and defensible under EU rules from day one.

According to the interviewed experts scaling up nuclear would help optimize unit costs. Nevertheless, these costs, especially in case of cost overruns for FOAK (First-of-a-Kind) projects still might be prohibitive for investors and demand support from the state side. Most of the interviewed experts preferred two of the financing models in the public debate – contract for difference (CfD) or cooperative models such as Mankala or SaHo model.

The Delphi study provides rather carefully optimistic approach regarding nuclear energy future in Polish energy mix. Experts are not rejecting nuclear; they are mainly discounting speed and institutional coordination, especially for SMRs and EU-level accelerators. 56% of the experts feels that the chances of SMRs exceeding 5 GW capacity up to 2050 in Poland are low, very low or nonexistent. Experts are however moderately optimistic that nuclear as a technology can reach a meaningful share of Polish electricity – around 20% – but their central expectation places that outcome after 2050.

The experts believe that joint purchasing mechanisms, such as orderbooks are beneficial for both buyers (securing lower prices and helping streamlining project timelines) as well as for producers (certainty of demand and better planning for production capacities). However, in our interviews they pointed out that even if this idea would be difficult to implement in the near future at a multinational level, there is a slightly bigger chance of successfully coordinating it on a national level. One of the ideas would be selecting one or two preferred SMR technologies for public support, and encouraging companies that might each purchase one or two reactors individually to pool their orders, enabling the country to place joint orders for a dozen or more units at a reduced price.

In the Delphi study, experts are even more cautious: they show limited confidence that EU-level joint purchasing and orderbook mechanisms will materialize quickly or strongly enough to be a critical-path enabler for Poland. The expert consensus is to treat orderbooks as upside rather than a base-case assumption as only 20% of Delphi study participants said that in their opinion there is high or very high probability of several EU countries establishing some form of joint purchasing mechanisms.

Among the biggest barriers for the widespread use of SMRs in Poland that the study participants pointed out are possibly higher investment costs than currently declared by the manufacturers, lack of changes in the EU policy regarding nuclear energy, and delays resulting from lack of experience with first-of-a-kind projects that SMRs would be in the early 30s.

Current legislative framework for nuclear energy – while in general reasonably complete – have some shortcomings that could also be addressed to help in developing nuclear investments (both small and large alike). First one: construction works beyond basic site preparation (e.g., levelling, temporary fencing, temporary power supply strictly for construction needs) must wait for the final building permit issued shortly after the regulator grants the construction license. As a result, no “real plant” works – excavation, foundations, auxiliary buildings – can begin earlier, which unnecessarily extends the critical path of nuclear project delivery.

A second structural issue is the absence of a structured generic design assessment: combined with licensing timelines, it means that ordering long-lead, safety-related items can only occur at the investor’s own risk. In practice, the same reactor built at multiple sites would need to undergo a full licensing review each time. There are also some smaller operational frictions that could negatively impact the process – one of such commonly pointed out was the documentation burden associated with Polish-language requirements.